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Abstract 
Financial innovation during the Great Moderation increased the size and scope of credit flows in 
the U.S. Credit flows increased both in volume and with regard to the range of activities and 
investments that was debt-financed. This may have contributed to the reduction in output 
volatility that was the Great Moderation. We hypothesize that during the Great Moderation (i) 
growth in mortgage finance partly decoupled from fundamentals as measured by overall output 
growth and (ii) this allowed mortgages less to finance residential investment and more to finance 
spending on other GDP components. We document that the start of the Moderation coincided 
with a surge in bank credit creation (especially mortgage credit), a rise in property income, a rise 
in the consumption share of GDP, and a change in correlation (from positive to negative) 
between consumption and non-consumption GDP components (investment, export and 
government expenditure). In a multivariate GARCH framework, we observe unidirectional 
causality in variance from total output to mortgage lending before the Great Moderation, which 
is no longer detectable during the Great Moderation. We also find that bidirectional causality in 
variance of home mortgage lending and residential investment existed before, but not during the 
Great Moderation. Both these findings are consistent with a role for credit dynamics in 
explaining the Great Moderation. 
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1. Introduction 
 
A substantial literature addresses the dramatic decline in macroeconomic volatility of the U.S. 
economy between the mid-1980s and the start of the 2007 financial crisis (Kim and Nelson 
1999)1. Warnock and Warnock (2000) documented strongly declining employment volatility. 
Blanchard and Simon (2001) noted declines in the standard deviation of quarterly growth and 
inflation by half and by two thirds, respectively, since 1984. Stock and Watson (2002) found that 
the standard deviation of U.S. GDP declined from 2.6 - 2.7% in the 1970s and 1980s to 1.5% in 
the 1990s. Bernanke (2004) drew broad attention to these trends by making it the topic of his 
2004 Eastern Economic Association speech. Many countries, particularly the Anglo-Saxon 
economies, shared this feature. Cechetti and Krause (2006) find that in sixteen out of twenty-five 
countries they examined, real GDP growth was on average more than fifty per cent less volatile 
than it was twenty years earlier to their study. 
Some writers argue that the greater stability signified that the U.S. economy entered a new 
phase around 1984. The name ‘Great Moderation’, reminiscent of America’s Great Depression 
and Great Inflation episodes, conveys this sense of a new era. The novel element is variously 
thought to be better inventory management (McConnell and Perez-Quiros, 2000; Kahn et al., 
2002; McCarthy and Zakajsek, 2007), fundamental labour market changes as the Baby Boomer 
generation is aging (Jaimovic and Siu, 2009), oil shocks (Nakov and Pescatori, 2010), changes in 
responses to shocks (Gambetti et al., 2008) or broader factors such as development levels 
(Acemoglu and Zilibotti, 1997; Easterley et al., 1993), external balances (Fogli and Perri, 2006),  
the size of the economy (Canning et al., 1998) and lack of strong institutions (Acemoglou et al., 
2003). Owyang et al. (2007) find that within U.S. states, the volatility decline was linked to 
larger nondurable-goods shares, energy consumption, and demographics. Other analysts point to 
the role of chance and suggest that the volatility decline may well be due to smaller or less 
frequent shocks to the economy, quite outside the influence of policy makers – or ‘good luck’ 
(Ahmed et al., 2002; Cogley and Sargent, 2005; Primeceri, 2005; Sims and Zha, 2006; Gambetti 
et al., 2008). Benati and Surico (2009) show that most analyses, which use Structural Vector 
Autoregression (SVAR) models, are compatible with both ‘good policy’ and ‘good luck.’ 
                                                 
1
 The end data of 2007 follows e.g. Barnett and Chauvet (forthcoming) and Bean (2011). 
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A number of papers pursue a ‘financial sector’ explanation of the Great Moderation. These 
revolve around financial innovations (Dynan et al., 2006; Guerron-Quintana, 2009), financial 
sector development (Easterly et al., 2000), changing responses to monetary shocks and 
improvements in monetary policy (Clarida et al., 2000; Bernanke, 2004; Lubik and Schirfheide 
2004; Boivin and Giannoni, 2006), and innovations in financial markets and in the dynamics of 
inflation (Blanchard and Simon, 2001). A common outcome of many of these developments is 
increased liquidity, though the reasons vary from monetary policy to trade integration to 
financial stability. For instance, Bean (2011) discusses how the volatilities of both U.S. equities 
and treasuries had shrunk to very low levels by the mid-2000s, and quotes the Dynan et al. 
(2006) explanation of how financial innovation smoothed financial variables (such as returns on 
financial assets). This signalled (correctly or falsely) low risk levels to both banks and real-sector 
actors, encouraging them to lend and borrow more, respectively. 
In the present paper we contribute to this literature. Financial innovation during the Great 
Moderation increased credit flows in the U.S. both in volume and with regard to the range of 
activities and investments they financed. We hypothesize that more of economic activity was 
debt-financed during the Great Moderation than before, and that those debt-financed incomes 
moved more independently from overall GDP, leading to a reduction in overall output volatility. 
We refer to this hypothesis as the ‘credit-driven Great Moderation hypothesis’ (or CDGM 
hypothesis, for short). 
Specifically, we hypothesize that during the Great Moderation (i) growth in mortgage 
finance partly decoupled from fundamentals as measured by overall output growth and (ii) this 
allowed mortgage less to finance residential investment and by implication, more to finance 
spending on other GDP components2. Below we document that the start of the Moderation 
coincided with a surge in bank credit creation (especially mortgage credit), a rise in property 
income, a rise in the consumption share of GDP, and a change in correlation (from positive to 
negative) between consumption and non-consumption GDP components (investment, export and 
government expenditure). In a multivariate Generalized Autoregressive Conditional 
                                                 
2
 Because this can occur in a number of ways, affecting a number of spending categories, we do not specify these 
‘other’ GDP components. They are likely to be a mix of consumption categories which cannot be mapped reliably 
on durables/nondurables, or some other statistical category. While the number of possible ways in which mortgage 
lending may have smoothed GDP is large, it is likely that all the channels have rising levels of home equity 
withdrawal in common. However, no sufficiently long pre-Great Moderation data on home equity withdrawal are 
available (Greenspan and Kennedy, 2008) so that we cannot apply the before/during analysis conducted in this paper 
to test for a change in the relation between GDP volatility and home equity withdrawal. 
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Heteroskedasticity (GARCH) framework, we observe unidirectional causality in variance from 
total output to mortgage lending before the Great Moderation, which is no longer detectable 
during the Great Moderation. We also find that bidirectional causality in variance of home 
mortgage lending and residential investment existed before, but not during the Great Moderation. 
Both these findings are consistent with a credit-driven Great Moderation, in conjunction with the 
other explanations discussed above. 
Importantly, we test these relations in variances rather than levels. The Great Moderation 
was a reduction in the variance of output (denoted Y), but also of the financial-sector variables 
that possibly caused it (Bean, 2011). We therefore study also the variances (not only the levels) 
of mortgage lending (denoted M) and residential investment (denoted RI). An intuitive way to 
see the importance of the causality-in-variance approach in this paper is to decompose output 
into residential investment and other GDP components so that Y=RI+(Y-RI) and 
var(Y)=var(RI)+var(Y-RI)+2cov(RI,Y-RI). Financial innovation may reduce var(Y) by reducing 
any one of the three right-hand terms of this expression. A VAR analysis in terms of levels only 
(e.g. Den Haan and Sterk, 2010) captures the first channel but not the second and third. And 
since this first channel is the least likely one, it is unsurprising that this method finds no evidence 
for the financial sector view of the Great Moderation3. By testing directly for var(Y), var(M) and 
var(RI) we capture all three possible channels, including (importantly) their covariances. We do 
this below in a multivariate GARCH framework. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we explore relevant 
trends in the U.S. economy and locate the argument in the literature. Section 3 develops the 
methodology and section 4 presents the data as well as the estimation and test results. Section 5 
concludes with a summing up and discussion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3
 Financial innovation may increase the level of credit-supported consumption and production, but there is no 
particular reason why it would reduce the volatility. 
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2. Locating the Argument: Empirical Trends and Relevant Literature 
 
2.1. Some Trends  
 
In this section we present and discuss six developments consistent with our hypothesis, and then 
locate it in the literature (Table 1; all data are taken from the Bureau of Economic Analysis).  
 
[Table 1 HERE] 
 
The average annual volatility of GDP growth nearly halved from 0.0105 in the 1970s and 0.0114 
in the 1980s to 0.006 over 1984-2007 – the key feature we attempt to explain, and which is also 
widely documented in other places (e.g. Bean, 2011). The share of consumption in GDP, which 
had been virtually stable between 60% and 63% from 1953 to 1981, rose from 64% in 1982 to 
70% in 2000-2007. Historically, this was a rapid increase. It implies that the importance of any 
factors driving consumption (such as mortgage lending) also became more relevant to 
understanding GDP and its volatility. Shocks to the investment, export and government 
expenditure components of GDP were increasingly counterbalanced by private consumption 
movements in opposite direction. The correlation coefficient between the two (in differenced 
growth rates) was positive (+0.25) in the 1970s but turned negative (-0.36 to -0.40) from the 
1980s onwards. Significantly, most of that decline occurred around the start of Great Moderation 
in the mid-1980s. For most of the Great Moderation years, declines in the combined investment, 
net export and government expenditures components of GDP were balanced by increases in 
private consumption.4 This is consistent with the view that variations in private consumption 
cushioned negative movements to the other, non-consumption GDP components, reducing the 
volatility of total output. 
The liquidity that facilitated the increase in consumption was provided by increases in the 
total bank credit stock, which doubled in relative terms from 1.5 times GDP in the 1970s to 3 
times GDP in the 2000s. The rise in bank credit creation was largely due to the most important 
category of credit in the domestic U.S. economy, the stock of mortgage credit. This rose from 
                                                 
4
 As these averages hide great variation, another way to illustrate this difference is to look at the percentage of two-
yearly moving-average correlation coefficients that was negative in each decade. This share of observations was 
30% in the 1970s, but 77% in the 1980s, 92% in the 1990s and 90% in the 2000s. 
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just 3% of GDP in the early 1950s to 30% of GDP in 1985 and on to an average 96% in the 
2000s. Other credit stocks also increased, especially in the Great Moderation, but more slowly. 
This shift in credit flows is linked to the rise in income from property as a share of GDP: 
from 30% in the 1970s to around 40% in the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s. Again, most of that 
increase occurred at the start of the 1980s. In the four years 1978-1982, income from property 
rose from 31% to 42% of GDP. Then it remained at that level, fluctuating between 35% and 45% 
for the remainder of the Great Moderation. This trend was also evident in the estimated housing 
wealth effect on consumption. Carroll et al. (2006) estimate that in the U.S. over 1960-2004, the 
immediate (next-quarter) marginal propensity to consume from a $1 change in housing wealth 
was about two cents, increasing to around between four and ten cents in the long run. During the 
Great Moderation, average nominal U.S. house prices more than tripled, so that the housing 
wealth effect would have induced an increase of consumption of 12 to 30 per cent over the 
period (in nominal values). To the extent that wealth-induced consumption was countercyclical 
to other GDP components, this could lead to significant GDP smoothing. These figures are only 
indicative, but the orders of magnitude are sufficiently large that the distribution of these gains 
over time will matter to the volatility of GDP. 
 
2.2. Relevant Literature 
 
The CDGM hypothesis fits into the Great Moderation literature. For instance, Gambetti et al. 
(2008) find changes in the way the private sector responds to supply and real demand shocks, 
together with changes in the variability of structural shocks. A next step is to research why 
responses changed; altered availability of credit is one possible reason. Beyond the Great 
Moderation literature, the present paper also connects to a strand of literature where credit is a 
key factor in understanding the macroeconomy, especially cyclicality and volatility (Bernanke, 
1993; Bernanke and Blinder, 1998; Bliss and Kaufmann, 2003). While most contemporary work 
on credit and the macroeconomy is in the spirit of the Credit View (Bernanke and Gertler, 1995) 
or some variety of an accelerator model (Kyotaki and Moore, 1997), the present emphasis is on 
the more traditional notion of credit as the prime source of liquidity, enabling agents to finance 
expenditures (as also in Borio and Lowe, 2004). This paper follows the Kocherlakota (2000) 
argument that credit constraints can create cycles, and extends this to the logically equivalent 
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argument that looser credit policies can create stability. It, thus, also connects to the literature 
which views business cycles (partly) as credit cycles (Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997; Mendicino, 
2007). In support, Benk et al. (2005), building on Uhlig (2004), identify credit shocks as 
candidate shocks that matter in determining GDP. 
We explore linkages between (the volatility of) credit components and GDP components. 
These linkages are supported by Caporale and Howells (2001) who analyse the interactions 
between bank loans, bank deposits and total transactions in the economy. They conclude that 
“loans cause deposits and that those deposits cause an expansion of wealth/GDP transactions” 
(Caporale and Howells, 2001:555). This paper is also focused on loan volumes rather than 
interest rates; Lown and Morgan (2006) show that loan volumes – determined largely by credit 
standards and regulation – dominate loan rates in explaining output and output components. 
Their work also suggests that the CDGM hypothesis is complementary (rather than rival) to the 
well established inventory explanation (McConnell and Perez-Quiros, 2000; Kahn et al., 2002; 
McCarthy and Zakajsek, 2007). The Lown and Morgan (2006) VAR analysis suggests a large 
impact of weakening of loan on declining inventory investment. This suggests that the widely 
noted decline in loan standards during the Great Moderation led to both declining inventory 
investment and to more mortgage lending. Both, in different ways, may have contributed to 
declining output volatility. Other closely related papers outside the Great Moderation literature 
are by Campbell (2005), who poses a link between rapid growth and increased volatility in credit 
flows to financial markets and stability in the real economy. Also, Lorrain (2006) finds that the 
volatility of industrial output is lower in countries with more bank credit. 
Den Haan and Sterk (2010) address another interpretation of the CDGM hypothesis in a test 
for structural breaks in the relation between mortgage lending and consumption in the U.S. in a 
SVAR specification – but in levels, not variances. They find no evidence of breaks and reject the 
hypothesis that financial innovation caused the Great Moderation. Another relevant finding is by 
Davis and Kahn (2008), who decompose the decline in macro volatility and find that most of it is 
explained by a combination of changes in firm-level volatility and aggregate volatility – most 
clearly in the durable goods sector. A surprising finding in their study is that both volatility 
declines occurred without a decline in the volatility of household consumption, or in the 
uncertainty of incomes. Davis and Kahn (2008) therefore ascribe the lower durable goods sector 
firm-level volatility not to financial innovation, but to real-sector supply-side factors including 
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better supply chain management (especially, inventory control) and a shift from employment and 
production from goods to services. However, both these studies consider the level, but not the 
variance of real output and its financial-sector determinants. This is where we break new ground. 
Even if the volatility of household consumption did not decline as Davis and Kahn (2008) report, 
if its covariance with other GDP components turned form positive to negative (Table 1) that 
would reduce output volatility.  
 
3. Methodology 
 
3.1. Modeling Volatility  
 
In this section we present our econometric model and approach. To model conditional variances 
and covariances we estimate a multivariate GARCH model, an extension of a univariate GARCH 
model (Bollerslev, 1986 based on Engle’s (1982) ARCH model). We first test for the existence 
of ARCH effects or volatility clustering, which is the tendency of large (small) changes (of either 
sign) to follow large (small) changes and, so that current and past volatility levels tend to 
correlate positively. In the presence of ARCH effects we proceed with the estimation of a 
multivariate GARCH model. Of the several possible specifications for multivariate GARCH 
models5 we choose an unrestricted bivariate VAR-BEKK model (Engle and Kroner, 1995), 
appropriate for the computation of conditional variances and covariances between variables6. 
Below we discuss the VAR-BEKK model in terms of two variables, home mortgages and either 
real output or residential investment. This implies two conditional mean equations. We choose a 
GARCH (1,1) model for the conditional variance specification because it is more parsimonious 
than ARCH, avoids over-fitting and is usually sufficient to capture volatility clustering (higher-
order model are rarely estimated in the academic finance literature). We test for bidirectional 
causality of the conditional variance of home mortgages growth with the conditional variance of 
output growth and of residential investment. Here we go.  
                                                 
5
 A common specification of multivariate GARCH models is the VECH model (Bollerslev et al. 1988), which seems 
infeasible to be estimated because of the large number of parameters. To solve this, Bollerslev et al. proposed the 
diagonal VECH, but this does not suit our purposes as it restricts the conditional variance-covariance matrix by 
assuming diagonal A and B matrices. Other specifications include the Constant Conditional Correlation (CCC) 
specification (Bollerslev, 1990) and the Dynamic Conditional Correlation (DCC) model (Engle, 2002; Tse and Tsui, 
2002). An analytical survey of multivariate GARCH models is in Bauwens et al. (2006).  
6
 The acronym BEKK comes from the synthesized work on multivariate ARCH models by Yoshi Baba, Rob Engle, 
Dennis Kraft and Ken Kroner. 
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The conditional mean equation is a VAR model specified as: 
 1 −=
= + Γ +
p
t t i ti
Y Yµ ε ,                                                                                                       (1) 
where, Yt = (y1t,y2t), y1 and y2 are the growth rates of home mortgages and of either real output or 
residential investment, respectively. The parameter vector of the mean equation (1) is defined by 
 = (1, 2) and the autoregressive term . The residual vector t = (1,t,2,t) is bivariate and 
normally distributed ( )1 0−t t t| ,Hε ψ with its corresponding conditional variance-covariance 
matrix given by: 
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The parameter matrices for the variance equation (2) are defined as C0, which is restricted to be 
upper triangular, and two unrestricted matrices, A11 and G11. Therefore, the second moment takes 
the following form: 
2
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         (3)                                                                
Equation (2) models the dynamic process of Ht as a linear function of its own past values 1tH −  as 
well as past values of squared innovations ( )2 21, 1 2, 1,t tε ε− − , allowing for influences from both 
investment/output and mortgages on the conditional variance. Importantly, this specification 
allows the conditional variances and covariances of the two series to influence each other. We 
can in this way test the null hypothesis of no volatility spillover effects in one or both directions. 
There are two further advantages. The specification requires estimation of only eight parameters 
for the bivariate system (excluding a constant). And estimating a BEKK model by construction 
guarantees that the variance-covariance matrix is positive definite. 
Assuming a multivariate standard normal distribution of the error terms, the parameters of 
the multivariate GARCH model are estimated by maximizing the log likelihood function: 
   
( ) ( ) 11 2
2norm t t t t
L mlog log H Hpi ε ε− ′= − + + 
                                                                        
(4) 
where m is the number of conditional mean equations and tε  is the m vector of mean equation 
residuals7. 
                                                 
7
 Laurent and Peters (2002) provide details on the log likelihood functions of multivariate GARCH models. 
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3.2. Causality-in-Variance Tests  
 
In the literature, testing for causality in variance has been based on the residual cross-correlation 
function (CCF), as in Cheung and Ng (1996), or by estimating of a multivariate GARCH 
framework, as in Caporale et al. (2002). The methodology developed by Cheung and Ng (1996) 
(extended by Hong, 2001) is a two-step procedure where the estimation of univariate GARCH 
models is followed by computation of CCFs of squared standardized residuals. Applications to 
the analysis of volatility spillovers include Kanas and Kouretas (2002), Alaganar and Bhar 
(2003) and Hong (2003). Van Dijk et al. (2005) suggest that the Cheung and Ng (1996) test 
could provide unreliable inference about the (non-) existence of causality in variance if structural 
changes have not been accounted for8. 
Caporale et al. (2002) propose an alternative by estimating a multivariate GARCH 
framework and then testing for the relevant zero restrictions on the conditional variance 
parameters. By constraining sequentially the matrices A11 and G11 to be upper triangular and 
lower triangular, they allow for causality in either direction. We prefer to test for bidirectional 
causality-in-variance in a one-step procedure with unrestricted matrices A11 and G11 . This has 
better power properties and is robust to model misspecification, as Hafner and Herwartz (2004) 
show. So, we test simultaneously the null hypotheses of no causality-in-variance from y1t to y2t, 
( 0 12 12: 0H a g= = ) and no causality-in-variance from y2t to y1t, ( 0 21 21: 0H a g= = ). Since this  
test for causality-in-variance would suffer from size distortions when causality-in-mean effects 
are left unaccounted for, we use the VAR specification of equation (1) to test also for causality in 
means (as recommended by Pantelidis and Pittis, 2004). In sum, we study the relations between 
mortgage growth, output growth and growth in residential investment both in means and in 
variances (equation (2))9. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
8
 Li et al. (2008) examine evidence of the contemporaneous causality-in-variance approach applying the method of 
Directed Acyclic Graphs (DAGs). See also Glymour and Cooper (1999) and Spirtes et al. (2000) for discussions.  
9
 Note that even if we were interested in the conditional mean only, outcomes would still depend on correctly 
modeling the conditional variance (Hamilton, 2008). In this respect our study is an innovation over other Great 
Moderation studies, notably the closely related Den Haan and Sterk (2010) paper. 
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4. Data and Estimation of Volatilities 
 
4.1. Data 
 
We employ quarterly data for the U.S. over two subsamples, 1954Q3-1978Q4 (before the Great 
Moderation) and 1984Q1-2008Q1 (during the Great Moderation)10. The data construction 
follows Den Haan and Sterk (2010)11, where this periodization is also argued. We calculated the 
logarithms of home mortgages (MORT), real GDP (RGDP) and residential investment (RINV), 
which are all stationary in their first differences (I(1)). 12 
As outlined above in section 3.1, we first examine the presence of ARCH effects (clustered 
volatility) by conducting the ARCH Lagrange Multiplier (ARCH-LM) test along 1-12 lags 
(Engle 1982). Table 2 reports descriptive statistics for the variables (mean, standard deviation, 
skewness, kurtosis and Jarque-Bera statistics) and values of the ARCH-LM statistic for the two 
subsamples. 
 
[Table 2 HERE] 
 
We see that variables exhibit positive growth rates (differenced logs) on average. The largest is 
for home mortgages in the first subsample (growing from a low base) and the smallest for 
residential investment growth in the second subsample. Real output growth and the growth of 
residential investment (but not mortgage growth) are more volatile before the beginning of the 
Great Moderation than during the Great Moderation, obviously. The distribution of home 
mortgages growth exhibits positive skewness with few high values in both subsamples; the 
opposite holds for real output and residential investment. Furthermore, the kurtosis (or 
“peakedness”) statistic for the distribution of mortgages growth shows more deviations from the 
                                                 
10
 Studying two samples is preferable to using a structural-break approach to one sample 1954Q3-2008Q1. Fang and 
Miller (2008) show that  the time-varying variance of output falls sharply or even disappears once they incorporate a 
one-time structural break in the unconditional variance of output starting 1982 or 1984. 
11
 We thank Wouter den Haan for making these data available, at http://www.wouterdenhaan.com/data.htm#papers.  
12
 We apply the following stationarity tests to the logs of the variables: (i) Kwiatkowski–Phillips–Schmidt–Shin 
(KPSS) (Kwiatkowski et al., 1992), (ii) Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) (Dickey and Fuller, 1979) and (iii) Phillips 
and Perron (PP) (Phillips and Perron, 1988). For tests (i) and (iii), the lag length was selected by the kernel-based 
estimator of the frequency zero spectrum, which is based on a weighted sum of the covariances. For test (ii) the 
selection of the number of lags in the test equations is according to the Schwartz Information Criterion (SIC). The 
stationarity is tested at 1%, 5%, 10% significance levels and the time trend has been taken into account in the test 
equation. The unit root test results are avaialable on request. 
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normal distribution in the first subsample than in the second. The Jarque-Bera (JB) statistic 
indicates normality of distributions except for the growth rates of home mortgages and 
residential investment in first and second subsample, respectively. Finally, the ARCH-LM test 
shows that there is evidence of ARCH effects in the squares of the growth rates of all variables in 
both subsamples. Overall, the descriptive statistics support the estimation of GARCH models 
assuming multivariate normally distributed errors. 
 
4.2. Empirical Results and Residual Diagnostics of the BEKK Model 
 
We then estimate the unrestricted BEKK model (equations (1)-(3)) where the system of 
conditional mean equations consists of are VAR(p) models ( 1,..., 4p = ). In each subsample, we 
estimate the model with the growth rates of (i) home mortgages and real output, and (ii) home 
mortgages and residential investment. Model selection is based on residual properties, i.e. no 
remaining GARCH effects and, if possible, no remaining autocorrelation. We use different sets 
of starting values for parameter estimation and then select the best model based on the Schwarz 
Information Criterion (SIC). Taking into account the residual properties of all estimated models, 
we end up considering a VAR(1)-BEKK model for both sets of variables in first subsample, and 
a VAR(2)-BEKK for both sets in the second subsample. Table 3 reports the estimated 
conditional variances with associated log-likelihood and SIC values, and numbers of 
observations. 
 
[Table 3 HERE] 
 
The results of the first part of Table 3 (the conditional mean equations) indicate that the growth 
rates of home mortgages and output are affected only by their own lagged values, in both 
1954Q3-1978Q4 and 1984Q1-2008Q1. The insignificance of the cross terms (12, 21, 12, 21) 
suggests that there is no interaction between the two variables, and therefore no spillovers in 
means. Growth rates of home mortgages and of residential investment are both influenced by 
their own lagged terms, and by lagged values of the other variable. This interaction, and thus the 
occurrence of spillovers in mean, is absent in the second subsample. 
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Now consider the conditional variance results in the second part of Table 3. Coefficients 12 
and 21 are indirect effects (spillover effect) while g12 and g21 are direct effects. For instance, 
coefficient a12 indicates if innovations in mortgage growth in quarter t decreases the conditional 
variance of output growth in quarter t+1. The estimation results do not support this, but we do 
observe volatility spillovers from output growth to home mortgage growth in the first subsample 
(coefficient value 21 = -0.2071). We also detect volatility spillovers in both directions between 
home mortgage growth and residential investment growth (7.04% and -4.84% respectively). In 
contrast, during the Great Moderation none of these volatility spillovers can be detected. 
Moreover, we detect that before the Great Moderation an increase in the volatility of mortgage 
growth causes an increase in the volatility of output growth (coefficient value g12=0.0911).   
In order to test causality in variance (the purpose for which we did the estimations) we need 
to consider both the indirect and direct effects and compute test statistics. Table 4 reports the test 
results. 
 
[Table 4 HERE] 
 
Before the Great Moderation, we observe overall causality in variance between home mortgages 
growth and output growth, based on unidirectional causality from output growth volatility to the 
volatility of home mortgages growth. In terms of variances, mortgage finance was driven by real-
sector fundamentals during 1954Q3-1978Q4. Second, we detect overall causality in variance 
between home mortgages growth and growth of residential investment, based on their 
bidirectional causality. Variances of mortgages and residential investment growth rates moved 
together during 1954Q3-1978Q4. Both these findings are absent in the second subsample. 
This is in line with the CDGM hypothesis, which attributes lower output volatility to the 
partial decoupling of finance from the real sector and of the (volatility of) mortgages from its 
primary use in supporting residential investment. These conditions would facilitate a trend in 
which mortgage (and other) finance came to support consumption growth that was 
countercyclical to GDP shocks (Table 1), so lowering the volatility of GDP. Thus, these findings 
are supportive of the CDGM hypothesis. 
Finally, we study residual diagnostics for the VAR-unrestricted BEKK models in order to 
test for remaining autocorrelation and ARCH effects (Table 5). The Ljung-Box Q-statistic of the 
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standardized residuals for two lag lengths (8 and 12 quarters) is not statistically significant (p = 
0.01) except in the first subsample for the growth rate of home mortgages, which exhibits 
remaining autocorrelation. We also compute squared standardized residuals and compute the Q-
statistic, which is never significant (p=0.01). Hence we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no 
remaining ARCH effects along the two lag lengths in both subsamples. 
 
[Table 5 HERE] 
 
 
5. Summary, Discussion and Conclusions  
 
Financial innovation during the Great Moderation increased credit flows both in volume and 
with regard to the range of activities and investments they could finance. We hypothesize that a 
larger part of economic activity was debt-financed during the Great Moderation than before, and 
that those debt-financed incomes moved more independently from other GDP components, 
leading to a reduction in overall output volatility. We refer to this hypothesis as the ‘credit-driven 
Great Moderation hypothesis’ (or CDGM hypothesis, for short). 
Specifically, we hypothesize that during the Great Moderation (i) growth in mortgage 
finance partly decoupled from fundamentals as measured by overall output growth and (ii) this 
allowed mortgage finance less to finance residential investment and by implication, more to 
finance spending on other GDP components. We document that the start of the Moderation 
coincided with a surge in bank credit creation (especially mortgage credit), a rise in property 
income, a rise in the consumption share of GDP, and a change in correlation (from positive to 
negative) between consumption and non-consumption GDP components (investment, export and 
government expenditure). 
We test the CDGM hypothesis formally by studying causality-in-variance of home mortgage 
lending, residential investment and total output, in a multivariate GARCH framework for the 
U.S. both over two periods, 1954-1978 (before the Great Moderation) and 1984-2008 (during the 
Great Moderation). It is significant that we test in variances rather than levels since the Great 
Moderation was about second, not first moments: it was a change in the variance of output but 
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also of the financial-sector variables that possibly caused it (Bean, 2011). Testing in variances 
allows for potential interaction of volatilities, which are not captured in the literature to date. 
We estimate a bivariate unrestricted BEKK model and conduct causality-in-variance tests 
following Caporale et al. (2002). We observe unidirectional causality in variance from total 
output to mortgage lending before the Great Moderation, which is no longer detectable during 
the Great Moderation. We also find that bidirectional causality in variance of home mortgage 
lending and residential investment existed before, but not during the Great Moderation. Both 
these findings are consistent with a credit-driven Great Moderation view, in conjunction with 
other explanations. We conclude with a discussion of its place in the wider literature and 
suggestions for future research. 
The present paper presents the argument that the Great Moderation was (partly) caused by a 
surge and shift in credit flows. It so provides a basis to connect the Great Moderation to the 
‘Great Panic’ and the ‘Great Depression’ as in Bean (2011). Empirically, Kemme and Roy 
(2012) utilize vector error correction models and panel probit and logit models to show that the 
U.S. mortgage-driven house price boom was a good predictor of the current crisis. The present 
paper also provides a link between Moderation and Crash: perhaps there was a moderation of 
volatility partly due to immoderate credit growth. 
The paper is consistent with, but different in focus from, other papers that take a ‘financial 
sector view’ of the Great Moderation. Increased liquidity is a common outcome of financial 
innovations (Blanchard and Simon, 2001, Dynan et al., 2005), financial sector development 
(Easterly et al., 2000) and improvements in monetary policy (Clarida et al., 2000; Bernanke, 
2004).  The novel contribution of this paper is that it attempts to analyse how this increase 
combined with a shift in the relation of credit aggregates (mortgage lending) with fundamentals 
(output growth) on the one hand, and with the financing of output components (residential 
investment) on the other hand. Methodologically, this paper presents a case for testing these 
relations in variance, since the Great Moderation is a puzzle about second moments (as also 
Bean, 2011 stresses). This is a major reason for our different findings from the closely related 
paper by Den Haan and Sterk (2010). In the present perspective, it is too early to write of ‘the 
myth of financial innovation and the Great Moderation’ (Den Haan and Sterk, 2010:707). 
In pursuing additional evidence or falsification of the CDGM hypothesis, several lines of 
inquiry are open. One is to be more specific about the channel from mortgage lending to those 
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countercyclical GDP components. The Table 1 correlations suggests that much of this is 
consumption in one form or another. But as noted, there is no simple link from changes in the 
use of mortgage finance to growth in a defined statistical category such as ‘durable goods 
consumption’. Also, including total consumption (the larger part of GDP) in the model poses 
serious endogeneity problems13. Whatever the precise delineation however, the channel through 
which mortgage growth feeds into growth of consumption (or other spending categories) is 
plausibly home equity withdrawal. Finding better, and especially longer, time series for home 
equity withdrawal than are presently available (Greenspan and Kennedy, 2008) is a major 
challenge, but potentially fruitful. 
Second, home mortgages are one instance (though the most important one) of credit flows 
that supported the price boom in all kinds of assets within the ‘Finance, Insurance and Real 
Estate’ category of the U.S. National Income and Product Accounts. Another way therefore of 
pursuing the CDGM hypothesis is to aggregate all these financial-sector credit flows rather than 
focusing on one of them. Any credit flows supporting the realization of capital gains which could 
then be used to smooth consumption is in principle relevant to the CDGM hypothesis. This 
would include bank credit supporting mortgage products but also those of pension funds, savings 
institutions, credit unions, funding corporations, exchange traded funds, money market mutual 
funds, and the like. There is broad agreement on the wealth effects of capital gains in these assets 
(through e.g. equity withdrawal, asset sales and share buybacks) but no research has been 
undertaken on the consequences for output volatility during the Great Moderation. Widening the 
definition of assets on which wealth effects operate might just introduce noise in the analysis (if 
house wealth really were the major or only relevant asset class), or it might provide a more 
complete view of wealth effects on output volatility during the Great Moderation. Exploring this 
is a fruitful avenue for future research. 
                                                 
13
 We thank James Kennedy for drawing our attention to this point. 
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TABLES 
 
 
Table 1: Trends in Credit and the Macroeconomy Before and During the U.S.  
Great Moderation 
(decade averages) 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s* 
     
Consumption** 
(% GDP) 
62.4 64.3 67.0 69.9 
     
correlation of consumption growth 
with non-consumption growth 
(coefficient)** 
25.4 -35.8 -35.8 -40.4 
     
total US domestic bank credit stock 
*** (% GDP) 
147.3 186.1 236.7 297.0 
     
bank mortgage credit stock 
(% GDP) 
14.5 29.1 54.9 96.3 
     
Income from property 
(% GDP) 
30.0 41.7 40.5 38.9 
     
Volatility of GDP growth 
(annual s.d., '000) 
 
10.5 11.4 5.4 6.3 
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis 
Note: all decadal figures are unweighted averages calculated from nominal quarterly data. 
* The 2000s include the 8 years of 2000 to 2007. 
** The ‘non-consumption’ part of GDP comprises investment, export and government expenditures; the 
‘consumption’ part includes private consumption. ‘Correlation’ is a two-year moving average of correlations 
between quarterly observations of differenced growth rates. 
*** The total US domestic bank credit stock is the value of all credit market instruments held as liability by the US 
domestic nonfinancial sector. 
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    Table 2: Descriptive Statistics  
 Mean Std dev. Skewness Kurtosis LM-Statistic JB 
       
1954Q3-1978Q4       
 
      
MORT 0.0235 0.0091 0.0887 4.6216 19.8769* 
(12) 
10.7556 
RGDP 0.0094 0.0109 -0.3512 3.5788 33.1762*** 
(12) 
3.3477 
RINV 0.0088 0.0501 -0.1068 3.2299 4.8668* 
(2) 
0.3981 
 
      
1984Q1-2008Q1       
 
      
MORT 0.0232 0.0092 0.3121 2.4492 40.1714*** 
(12) 
2.7721 
RGDP 0.0074 0.005 -0.2454 3.2731 3.5213* 
(1) 
1.2620 
RINV 0.0029 0.0284 -0.8581 3.5416 10.3171* 
(5) 
12.9547 
 
Notes: The variables included refer to the first difference of the logarithm of the initial series. ARCH-LM test has been 
conducted and the value of LM-Statistic is presented. The numbers in parentheses represent the number of lags used for 
the ARCH-LM test; ***, * denote rejection of the null hypothesis of no ARCH effects at 1% and 10% significance level, 
respectively. 
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Table 3: VAR-BEKK (unrestricted) Estimates 
 
Parameters Pre-Great Moderation 
sample 
During-Great 
Moderation sample 
Pre-Great Moderation 
sample 
During-Great Moderation 
sample 
 
1954Q3-1978Q4 1984Q1-2008Q1 1954Q3-1978Q4 1984Q1-2008Q1 
 
    
 (a) Conditional Mean Equation 
     
 VAR(1) VAR(2) VAR(1) VAR(2) 
 MORT ( 1ty )-RGDP ( 2ty ) MORT ( 1ty )-RINV ( 2ty ) 
     
1µ  0.0039*** (0.0013) 
0.0051* 
(0.0027) 
0.0037** 
(0.0014) 
0.0039** 
(0.0019) 
2µ  0.0074** (0.0037) 
0.0044** 
(0.0022) 
0.0343** 
(0.0150) 
0.0064 
(0.0072) 
( )11 1 1t   yγ −  0.8337*** (0.0530) 
0.4878*** 
(0.1040) 
0.8386*** 
(0.0573) 
0.4429*** 
(0.0938) 
( )12 2 1t   yγ −  0.0042 (0.0448) 
-0.1282 
(0.1109) 
0.0272*** 
(0.0094) 
-0.0147 
(0.0310) 
( )21 1 1t   yγ −  0.0165 (0.1417) 
0.0368 
(0.0916) 
-1.1905* 
(0.6309) 
0.1495 
(0.3199) 
( )22 2 1t   yγ −  0.2434** (0.1025) 
0.10159 
(0.1226) 
0.4514*** 
(0.1047) 
0.6611*** 
(0.1342) 
( )11 1 2t   yθ −   0.3408*** (0.1057) 
 0.3863*** 
(0.1009) 
( )12 2 2t   yθ −   -0.0468 (0.1500) 
 0.0452 
(0.0348) 
( )21 1 2t   yθ −   -0.0260 (0.0728) 
 -0.3433 
(0.3532) 
( )22 2 2t   yθ −   0.3048** (0.1228) 
 -0.0247 
(0.1430) 
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Table 3 (continued) 
 
Parameters Pre-Great Moderation 
sample 
During-Great 
Moderation sample 
Pre-Great Moderation 
sample 
During-Great Moderation 
sample 
 
1954Q3-1978Q4 1984Q1-2008Q1 1954Q3-1978Q4 1984Q1-2008Q1 
 
    
 (b) Conditional Variance Equation 
     
 BEKK-GARCH(1,1) 
 MORT ( 1ty )-RGDP ( 2ty ) MORT ( 1ty )-RINV ( 2ty ) 
     
11c  0.0013 (0.0093) 
-0.0006 
(0.0021) 
-0.0028*** 
(0.0004) 
0.0010 
(0.0010) 
12c  -0.0074 (0.0887) 
-0.0026 
(0.0071) 
-0.0134 
(0.0126) 
0.0041 
(0.0063) 
22c  0.00006 (9.8149) 
0.0031 
(0.0061) 
0.00001 
(40.3586) 
0.0030 
(0.0053) 
11a  -0.5916*** (0.1552) 
0.1202 
(0.1384) 
-0.2941 
(0.2101) 
0.0010 
(0.1787) 
12a  0.4937 (0.8419) 
0.1170 
(0.1638) 
0.0704*** 
(0.0250) 
0.5740 
(0.5456) 
21a  -0.2071*** (0.0419) 
0.1963 
(0.2727) 
-0.0484*** 
(0.0141) 
0.0661 
(0.0556) 
22a  -0.2313 (0.2073) 
0.4139 
(0.2673) 
-0.2431 
(0.1898) 
0.5740 
(0.5456) 
11g  0.0216 (0.5320) 
0.9642*** 
(0.0372) 
0.0021 
(0.2189) 
0.9682*** 
(0.0400) 
12g  0.2936 (1.4335) 
-0.0421 
(0.2329) 
0.0911** 
(0.0427) 
0.0352 
(0.2316) 
21g  0.2008 (0.5614) 
-0.1249 
(0.8319) 
-0.0122 
(0.0277) 
-0.0281 
(0.0317) 
22g  0.6332 (1.1407) 
-0.0036 
(2.1717) 
0.1041 
(0.4478) 
0.8639*** 
(0.0906) 
     
Log 
Likelihood 
691.8080 744.9436 574.0287 612.0617 
SIC -13.8977 -14.5212 -11.2700 -11.7528 
N 94 96 95 96 
 
Note: Figures and numbers in parentheses reflect the estimates and the corresponding standard errors, respectively; ***, **,* indicate 
statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 4: Granger Causality Tests in Variance 
 
 
Hypothesis Chi-square 
Statistic 
Prob 
1954Q3-1978Q4     
 
    
 Overall Causality between MORT and RGDP   
    
 0 12 21 12 11: 0H a a g g= = = =  25.1290 0.0000 
    
 Causality from MORT to RGDP   
    
 0 12 12: 0H a g= =  0.3457 0.8413 
    
 Causality from RGDP to MORT   
    
 0 21 21: 0H a g= =  24.5918 0.0000 
 
    
 
Overall Causality between MORT and RINV   
 
    
 0 12 21 12 11: 0H a a g g= = = =  6.02901 0.0000 
     
 Causality from MORT to RINV   
     
 0 12 12: 0H a g= =  9.9533 0.0069 
 
    
 
Causality from RINV to MORT   
 
    
 0 21 21: 0H a g= =  12.7111 0.0017 
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Table 4 (continued) 
 
 
Hypothesis Chi-square 
Statistic 
Prob 
1984Q1-2008Q1     
 
    
 Overall Causality between MORT and RGDP   
    
 0 12 21 12 11: 0H a a g g= = = =  1.3826 0.8472 
    
 Causality from MORT to RGDP   
    
 0 12 12: 0H a g= =  0.5102 0.7748 
    
 Causality from RGDP to MORT   
    
 0 21 21: 0H a g= =  0.7381 0.6914 
 
    
 
Overall Causality between MORT and RINV   
 
    
 0 12 21 12 11: 0H a a g g= = = =  4.0079 0.4049 
     
 Causality from MORT to RINV   
     
 0 12 12: 0H a g= =  1.2396 0.5381 
 
    
 
Causality from RINV to MORT   
 
    
 0 21 21: 0H a g= =  1.4159 0.4926 
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Table 5: Residual diagnostics 
 
 
MORT,tε  RGDP,tε  RINV,tε  
 
   
1954Q3-1978Q4    
 
   
Q(8) 24.613  
[0.002] 
3.6047 
[0.891] 
7.6552 
[0.468] 
Q2(8) 3.5104 
[0.898] 
2.1571 
[0.976] 
13.574 
[0.094] 
    
Q(12) 40.252 
[0.000] 
8.305 
[0.761] 
10.669 
[0.557] 
Q2(12) 6.3648 
[0.897] 
4.8547 
[0.963] 
18.320 
[0.106] 
 
   
1984Q1-2008Q1    
 
   
Q(8) 15.903 
[0.044] 
5.4035 
[0.714] 
9.7428 
[0.284] 
Q2(8) 6.2651 
[0.618] 
8.1651 
[0.418] 
14.541 
[0.069] 
    
Q(12) 19.324 
[0.081] 
13.684 
[0.321] 
13.923 
[0.306] 
Q2(12) 12.662 
[0.394] 
12.479 
[0.408] 
14.994 
[0.242] 
 
Notes: Probability values are in brackets. Q(p) and Q2(p) are the Ljung-Box test  
statistic for pth order serial correlation for standardized residuals and squared  
standardized residuals, respectively.
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